[Dnssec-deployment] Root key rolling (was NIST guidance as to DNSSEC and others)

[Jakob Schlyter]

On 9 feb 2012, at 01:48, Michael StJohns wrote:

> A key on the HSM can be compromised:
>  via compromise of the HSM hardware, 
>  a fault in the HSM firmware
>  by theft of the HSM along with the activation credentials, 
>  by theft of the HSM master keys (not sure the HSM you're using has externalized master keys - so) and the encrypted back up material.

One should note that this is instantaneously detectable by facility monitoring, security guards, alarms and whatnot, ...

> A key outside of the HSM can be compromised by:
>  decrypting the backup
>      which implies that you a) have a copy of the backup
>      and b) have the key shares or
>       c) have a way of breaking the encryption.

... whereas this is not detectable until someone launches an attack.


	jakob