[dnssec-deployment] aug2004 CAM of interest?
bmanning at vacation.karoshi.com
bmanning at vacation.karoshi.com
Tue Aug 17 16:55:24 EDT 2004
> > my worry is the IETF change process. :)
>
> My worry is the sun going nova and consuming the Earth.
me too :)
> Bill, let's not let our fears outstrip our ability to make progress.
not at all. just don't want to forget hard earned lessons.
> > Field upgrades to replace "busted crypto"
> > with "pristine crypto" are going to be loads of fun. Someone
> > with a better eye for detail (Olafur/Ed?) may want to retiterate
> > the interesting problems with signing w/ different algos last
> > century. Me thinks we still have this as a latent issue.
>
> Yeah, if you think zone enumeration is an issue, try mixing
> algorithms. My first bad experience came about 5 years ago with the
> writing of the second signer. It was a pain then. It still was in
> spring of 2003 when we thought of this at the palatial ISC office
> park:
>
> E.g., what if a zone has keys of algorithm X and Y, and the validator
> has just X keys. Assuming that the parent of the zone also has X,
> the validator can then validate the DS set for the zone, as well as
> the DNSKEY RR for the zone.
>
> At that time, the specs allowed the zone admin to choose to sign
> everything else in the zone with just Y. How does the validator
> detect that the absence of an X signature is 1) by admin choice or 2)
> a stripping attack?
>
> I don't know if the proposed solution made DNSSECbis. How realistic
> is this? Imagine X as a current mandatory to implement algorithm and
> Y as a replacement for a broken X. If this isn't fixed, then we
> could wind up with confused validaters.
I think that long-term, this is -very- realistic.
Stuff gets broken and has to be swapped out/replaced.
Handwaving (there be dragons) is only ok if one remembers
that they must be dealt with ... possibly sooner than later.
This is going to be harder than key rollover.
> Multiple algorithms and mixing mandatory-to-implement with
> experimental algorithms is a box owned by Pandora.
amen. but we'd better open it anyway. (or am I the lone
wolf on this?)
--bill
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